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Abstract 
This research evaluates the seismic vulnerability of the Critical Energy Infrastructure (CEI) Hub 
and the associated fuel repercussions for the expected 9.0 magnitude earthquake along the 
Cascadia Subduction Zone. The tanks in the CEI hub are analyzed based on size and content. 
The owners and secondary containment areas are discussed using the same parameters. Various 
analysis techniques are reviewed to determine the most appropriate seismic fragility estimate for 
the site. The seismic vulnerability is analyzed using fragility curves by Hazus, American Lifeline 
Alliance, and D’Amico. The fragility curves are applied to the CEI Hub to determine expected 
damage and the related fuel loss impacts. Gasoline and diesel have the highest expected damage 
with a maximum prediction of 13.7 million and 9.5 million gallons respectively experiencing 
complete content loss.   
Introduction 
The CEI Hub is located on the Willamette River in NW Portland, Oregon and is approximately 6 
miles long. The CEI Hub accounts for the storage of 90% of Oregon’s fuel and contains all jet 
fuel used at the Portland International Airport (Dusicka & Norton, 2019). The research aims to 
evaluate the seismic vulnerability of individual tanks based on size and content. The tank owners 
in the CEI Hub are British Petroleum (BP), Chevron, Kinder Morgan, McCall, Nustar, Pacific 
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1.0 Tank Data 
The purpose of this section is to analyze and characterize the existing tanks in the CEI Hub. The 
research includes information on 514 tanks with geographical information for 271 tanks. The 
preliminary categorization of tanks aims to determine the volume and content held by the tanks.  
1.1 Capacity Criteria 
A 100,000 gallon capacity cut-off is employed so analysis focuses on larger tanks. There are 5 
tanks in the data that did not have a documented capacity. Chevron and Nustar make up the tanks 
with 2 and 3 tanks respectively. 6 tanks had a documented capacity of 0 gallons, and all are 
owned by BP. Figure 1-1 shows the fuel distribution of the total CEI Hub with decreasing single 
tank capacities.  
A majority of fuel is able to stay in analysis with the cutoff. Tanks with a capacity greater than 
100,000 gallons make up approximately 98% of the total capacity of the data set. This accounts 
for approximately 285 million gallons for analysis. The cut-off reduces the number of tanks 
analyzed from 514 to 197. In addition, of the 271 tanks with geographical information, 171 tanks 
Figure 1-1  Sum o f  Tota l  Tank Capaci t i e s  by  d ecrea s ing  
ind iv idual  tank  capaci t y  (mi l l ion  gal lons) .  Poin t s  r epresent  
ind iv idual  tanks ,  and  red  l ine  r epresen t s  the  100 ,000  gal lon  
capaci t y  cu t -o f f .  
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had a capacity greater than 100,000 gallons. Only tanks with capacity greater than 100,000 
gallons were used for the remainder of analysis. 
1.2 Average Fill Inconsistencies 
The tank capacity was used as the main input for the tanks due to uncertainty in the recorded 
average fill data. The average fill in 27 of the documented 514 tanks recorded greater than the 
capacity of the tank. An average fill greater than the capacity indicates an error in the record. A 
commonality in tanks with an average fill greater than the capacity could not be found. In 
addition, 255 tanks did not have a recorded average fill. Due to this, it was determined that 
average fill would not be used for analysis.  
1.3 Fuel Types 
The tanks were analyzed further based on fuel type. The purpose of this analysis is to determine 
the repercussions of lack of access to different types of fuel. Non-fuel includes substances like 
asphalt, lubricants, motor oil, waters, and base oils. Tanks with gasoline/diesel have a history and 
capability of holding both substances. Figure 1-2 shows the fuel distribution of the CEI Hub by 
volume. 
Figure 1-2  Fuel  d i s t r ibu t ion  o f  the  CEI  Hub by  vo lu me.  
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The number of tanks, total capacity (million gallons), and percent of total capacity are shown in 
the above figure. The majority of fuel is gasoline (31%) and diesel (22%), equating to 
approximately 90 million gallons of gasoline and approximately 60 million gallons of diesel fuel. 
Gasoline is contained in 40 tanks, and diesel is contained in 33 tanks. Non-fuel accounts for the 
largest number of tanks at 61 tanks but only 18% of the total capacity of the CEI Hub. Two tanks 
with an unknown substance account for 4% of total capacity, and 32 out of service tanks account 
for 5%. Ethanol represents 3% of the total capacity in 8 tanks. Jet fuel accounts for 7% of the 
total volume in 8 tanks. As seen, the number of tanks is not an indicator of total cumulative 
capacity, and due to this wide variability in tank size both number of tanks and total cumulative 
capacity are used for the majority of analysis. Figure 1-3 shows the fuel distribution based on 
owner. 
Figure 1-3  Fuel  d i s t r ibu t ion  by owner  o f  the CEI  Hu b us ing  number  o f  
tanks  (Top)  and  sum o f  tan k  capac i t i es  (bo t tom) .  
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Kinder Morgan has the largest number of tanks and largest total capacity of 93 million gallons in 
65 tanks. Notably, Kinder Morgan owns 29 out of service tanks that hold a total capacity of 
approximately 25 million gallons. Kinder Morgan holds approximately 37 million gallons of 
gasoline in 15 tanks and 20 million gallons of jet fuel in 7 tanks. Nustar has the second highest 
total capacity at 53 million gallons in 34 tanks, almost half that of Kinder Morgan. Nustar stores 
a majority of gasoline/diesel, approximately 28 million gallons. Chevron contains the 2 tanks 
with unknown substance and 24 non-fuel tanks holding a cumulative capacity of approximately 8 
million gallons. Comparatively, McCall has 5 non-fuel tanks holding a cumulative capacity of 24 
million gallons. The other 5 tanks owned by McCall contain 15.6 million gallons of diesel.  
2.0 Secondary Containments 
The tanks located in the CEI hub are surrounded by a secondary containment. Secondary 
containment acts as a second line of defense in the event of a tank failure. The minimum 
requirements for secondary containment are determined by The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in 40 CFC 112.8 and 40 CFC 112.7 of the Spill Prevention, Control, and 
Countermeasure (SPCC) Regulation. For the purpose of the tank research, the most relevant 
criteria is in 40 CFC 112.8 stating that the secondary containment area needs at minimum to be 
able to contain the full capacity of the largest tank in addition to the precipitation of a 24 hour 
25-year storm (2021). In addition the containment must be completely impervious (2021). A 
majority of the secondary containment systems are considered to be earth walls. A strong 
consensus of the location, area of, and volume capacity of the secondary containment could not 
be determined without more information. The secondary containment information was gathered 
from satellite imaging of the CEI Hub from google image.  Throughout analysis, the 100,000 
gallon tank capacity cutoff discussed in Section 1 will be used.  
CE403 Honors Thesis Bal 
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2.1 Secondary Containment Identification 
The outline of the secondary containment areas is shown in Figure 2-1 and are color coded by 
owner. Each facility contains multiple secondary containment 
areas. The secondary containments are numbered and use an 
abbreviated version of the owner’s name. Maps labelling the 
northern and southern containment areas can be found in 
Appendix A. Kinder Morgan is the only owner with two 
separate tank facilities. KM1 and KM2 make up the Southern 
Kinder Morgan Wellbridge, and KM3 and KM4 make up the 
Northern Kinder Morgan Linton.  
A table of the estimated area of the secondary containment can be found in Appendix A. Figure 
2-2 graphs the secondary containment by area in acres. 
The largest secondary containments by area are MC1 and KM1 at 10.7 acres and 10.1 acres 




Figure 2 -2  A rea  o f  s econd ary  con ta inmen ts  in  acres .  
Figure 2 -1  S econdary  
conta inment  areas co lor  coded  
by  owner. 
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2.2 Fuel Types 
The secondary containment areas were then analyzed based on fuel type. The 
cri teria used in Section 1.0 continues to be employed for the analysis.  Figure 2-
3 shows the fuel distribution by secondary containment.            
Figure  2-3  Fu el  d i s tr ibu t i on  by  owner  o f  s econdary  con ta inment  a reas us ing  number o f  tanks  (Topt )  
and  sum o f  tank  capaci t i e s  (Bot tom) .  
CH1, KM1, and MC1 have the highest capacities at approximately 47.9 million, 
39.2 million,  and 38.7 million gallons respectively. KM1 and CH1 have the 
largest number with tanks of 27 and 20 tanks respectively. Comparatively, MC1 
contains only 7 tanks with a capacity greater than 100,000 gallons.  KM1 
contains a majori ty gasoline by volume, 28 million gallons, and contains 11 out 
CE403 Honors Thesis Bal 
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of service tanks that hold 780 thousand gallons.  CH1 holds 25 million gallons of 
gasoline in addit ion to approximately 13 million gallons of unknown substances. 
MC1 contains 23 million gallons of non-fuel , approximately 15 million gallons 
of diesel.  
A primary concern is  that there are large tanks grouped together in secondary 
containment areas. MC1 has  two tanks with capacities greater than 10 million 
and 3 tanks with capacities greater than 1 million. CH1 has 1 tank with a 
capacity greater than 10 million, and 8 tanks with capacities  greater than a 
million gallons.  The minimum requirement for capacity of secondary 
containment areas is total  capacity of the largest tank and precipitation;  if only 
the minimum requirement is  met for these SC areas, there would be a significant 
amount of substance going into the river if multiple large tanks failed.  
2.3 Tanks with Unknown Location 
There are 26 tanks with a capacity greater than 100,000 gallons that have an 
unknown location. Chevron, Kinder Morgan, and Phillips 66 own 19, 5,  and 2 of 
the unknown tanks respectively. The unknown Kinder Morgan tanks are located 
in the Northern Linton Facility. This is  known because the Tank IDs for all  5 
tanks follow the convention of “KML####”. The substance was graphed for the 
unknown tanks in  Figure 2-4.  
CE403 Honors Thesis Bal 
 P a g e  | 10   
 
Figure  2-4  Fu el  d i s tr ibu t i on  o f  tanks  wi th  unknown  secondary  con ta inment  a reas are  shown  us ing  th e  
number o f  tanks  (Le f t )  and  sum o f  tan k capac i t i es  (Right ) .  
The 26 tanks hold a sum capacity of approximately 12 million gallons. Chevron 
holds 10.4 million gallons.  Kinder Morgan holds approximately 660 thousand 
gallons. Phil lips 66 holds approximately 600 thousand gallons. Notably, 
Chevron has one tank that holds 6 mill ion gallons of unknown substance. The 
majority of the current analysis will be done in terms of the entire CEI Hub 
because uncertainty in the secondary containment  areas due to both unknown 
tanks and secondary containment boundaries and volume capacities.    
3.0 Fragility Curves 
This section provides background information on available seismic fragility curves. Fragility 
curves are used to determine the possible repercussions of a seismic event for various Peak 
Ground Accelerations (PGA), and are commonly represented as lognormal functions. PGA refers 
to the highest acceleration of the ground during a seismic event and is recorded in terms of 
gravitational acceleration. Five fragility curves are considered to determine the most accurate 
estimates for the CEI Hub. Throughout this section, the different fragility curves and associated 
parameters are discussed prior to the further calculations detailed in Section 5.0. 
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3.1 Fragility Curves 
Five analysis techniques were considered, Hazus, American Lifeline Alliance (ALA), O’Rourke, 
Salzano, and D’Amico. ALA, O’Rourke, and Salzano use an empirical approach, and Hazus and 
D’Amico use an analytical approach (D'Amico & Buratti, 2018). The different parameters used 
for the fragility curves are available in Table 3-1. 
Tab le  3 -1  Descr ip t ions  o f  the  con s idered  f ragi l i t y  curves .  I f  the  descr ip t ion  ap pl ies  the  f rag i l i t y  
curve ,  i t  i s  marked  wi th  a n  "X "(D'Amico & Buratti, 2018).  
 
Percent fill and anchorage conditions were determined as the focus for the damage parameters. 
The H/D parameter refers to the height of the tank divided by the diameter of the tank. Currently, 
there are 25 tanks with an unknown height and diameter, and the known height to diameter ratios 
of tanks is highly variable. Due to this H/D is not used for analysis. The anchorage conditions 
have a significant effect on the damage probability of tanks. This comparison is investigated in 
Section 3.4. In addition, the tanks in the CEI Hub are assumed to be at a high fill, and therefore 
the effect fill level is discussed in Section 3.3. The difference in Risk State and Damage State are 
discussed in Section 3.2. 
3.2 DS versus Risk State 
The two main definitions used to assess seismic vulnerability are Risk State (RS) and Damage 
State (DS). RS emphasizes the loss of content and environmental consequences. DS focuses on 
the structural damage of the tanks (D'Amico & Buratti, 2018). Different analysis techniques 
CE403 Honors Thesis Bal 
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employ various definitions for RS and DS. Only fragility curves that use DS are considered for 
analysis to allow for comparison to Hazus. Hazus is the methodology generated by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and therefore can be considered a baseline for other 
analysis. The definition of DS is not consistent for the various curves. It was determined that the 
variation in DS definition was insignificant, so differences were excluded from the analysis to 
allow for simplicity. A basic definition of damage states is provided in Table 3-2. 
In addition to Hazus, ALA and D’Amico are used for analysis because both analyze the effects 
of anchorage conditions and percent fill and use DS definitions. The mean, μ, and the standard 
deviation, σ, of ln(PGA) for each damage state for Hazus, ALA, and D’Amico are recorded in 
Appendix B Tables B-1, B-2, and B-3, respectively. For the fragility curve discussion, only DS 4 
graphs are shown unless otherwise indicated. DS 3 and DS 5 fragility curves can be found in 
Appendix B. 
3.3 Effects of Percent Fill 
The effect of percent fill for tanks was analyzed in D’Amico and ALA. The fragility curves show 
similar effects for percent fill. The variation due to percent fill for D’Amico and ALA are shown 
in Figure 3-1. 
Table  3-2  DS conceptual  de f in i t ion s .  
CE403 Honors Thesis Bal 
 P a g e  | 13   
 
Figure  3-1  DS  4  f ragi l i t y  curves  for  the  ef f ec t s  o f  percent  f i l l .  ALA i s  sho wn  on  the  l e f t ,  and  D' Amico  
i s  shown on  th e  r igh t .  
Both D’Amico and ALA show that the seismic vulnerability for tanks increases with an increase 
in fill. ALA is an empirical methodology which is why it uses tank data with fill percentages at 
greater than or equal to a percent. On the other hand, D’Amico is an analytical technique that 
inputs the fill value of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.9 which equates to 20%, 50%, and 90% fill. D’Amico uses 
percent fill as an input that affects the tank fragility which is why all tank data is most similar to 
0.5 fill. ALA shows that all tank data is less than tanks with a fill greater than or equal to 50%. 
This is because ALA used tanks that had a fill less than 50% in the all tank data. These trends are 
similar for DS 3 and DS 5 for D’Amico and DS 3 for ALA. For DS 5, ALA shows a significant 
change in trend. Figure 3-2 shows ALA’s DS 5 fragility curve for affect of percent fill.  
CE403 Honors Thesis Bal 
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Tanks will fill greater than or equal to 50% and 60% show a similar fragility, and all tanks and 
tanks with fill greater than or equal to 90% show a similar fragility. Tanks greater than 50% and 
greater than 60% fill have a significantly higher probability of damage than tanks greater than 
90% fill for PGA values 0.4g-1.0g.  ALA cites the small data set for the variation caused in DS 
5. For tanks that have fill greater than or equal to 50%, only 15 tanks sustained DS 5 damage out 
of the total database of 251 tanks. ALA considers that 6% of tanks that reach DS 2 DS could be a 
more accurate estimate (2001). For the current analysis, the ALA fragility function is used for 
DS 5 data, though there are significant uncertainties.  
3.4 Effects of Anchorage  
Hazus, D’Amico, and ALA provide fragility curves for only unanchored tanks. Figure 3-3 
compares the difference in damage probability for all tank data versus unanchored tanks.  
Figure  3-2  A LA' s  DS 5  gra ph dep ic t ing  the  e f fec t s  o f  
percent  f i l l .  
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ALA and D’Amico both show that probability of damage for unanchored tanks is higher than the 
all tank fragility curve. Hazus only provides fragility curves for unanchored and anchored tanks, 
and therefore an all tank fragility curve cannot be compared. Figure 3-4 compares unanchored 
and anchored tank fragility for Hazus.  
Similar to ALA and D’Amico, Hazus shows a higher probability of damage for unanchored 
tanks. The difference in unanchored tanks and anchored tanks for Hazus is smaller than ALA and 
D’Amico. Figure 3-5 compares Hazus, D’Amico, and ALA unanchored fragility curves. 
Figure 3 -3  DS  4  f rag i l i t y  curves  for  ALA and  D' Amico  
unanchored  versus  a l l  tan k .  
Figure 3-4  DS 4  f ragi l i t y  curve  fo r  Ha zus unanchored  
versu s  anchored  tanks .  
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The fragility curves produce similar information for low PGA values. D’Amico and ALA 
provide similar values for large PGA values, and Hazus shows significantly higher probability of 
failure for PGA values higher than 0.6g.   
In addition to Hazus, ALA produces a fragility curve for anchored tanks. Figure 3-6 compares 
ALA anchored tanks to all tanks. 
Figure 3 -5  DS  4  f rag i l i t y  curves  for  Hazu s,  ALA,  an d  
D'Amico  unanchored  tanks .  
Figure 3-6  DS 4  f ragi l i t y  curve  fo r  ALA anchored  
versu s  a l l  tank .  
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For ALA, anchored tanks have a significantly lower probability of failure compared to all tanks 
for PGA values greater than 0.2g for DS 4. For PGA values lower than 0.2g, the probability of 
DS 4 is nominal for both anchored tanks and all tanks.  Figure 3-7 compares Hazus and ALA.  
Hazus and ALA have significantly different probabilities of failure after 0.2g for all DSs. Hazus 
predicts higher probability of damage, however ALA predicts probability of damage less than 
20% for PGA values up to 1.4g.  
4.0 Analysis 
The analysis combines the fragil ity curves discussed in Section 3 with tank 
information from Section 3 using anticipated PGA values for the site. The 
analysis consists  of multiple est imations to show the range of probable damage. 





Figure 3-7  DS 4  graph for  Hazus  and  ALA anchored  
tanks .  
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4.1 Peak Ground Acceleration  
Due to  geology and wave propagation,  the exact impact of a 9.0 magnitude 
earthquake cannot be defined. Instead, different  scenarios for the expected 9.0 
magnitude were determined by the CSZ@pdx tool  (Dusicka).  Figure 4-1 shows 
the 30 different seismic scenarios.  
The grey lines were used to  plot 30 different  seismic event scenarios, and the 
red lines plotted show the mean and mean plus one standard deviation. The 
seismic event scenarios are site specific and take into account the geography 
and geology of the CEI Hub. The spectral  acceleration represents the 
acceleration of a  point on a structure due to a seismic event and is  dependent on 
the period of a st ructure. The PGA value occurs at  period approaching 0 
seconds.  The mean PGA value is  0.187g, and the mean plus one standard 
deviat ion PGA value is 0.275g. Predicted PGA is inputted into the fragility 
curve lognormal function to  provide a probability of damage. A majority of 
analysis is discussed in terms of the mean plus one standard deviation to create 
a conservative estimate.   
Figure 4 -1  Graph  o f  spect ra l  acce lera t ion  by  p er iod  
for  30  possib l e  sei smic  events  and  the  mean and mean  
p lus  one  s tandard  dev ia t ion  predi c ted  va lues .  
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4.2 Unanchored Tanks 
The anchorage conditions of tanks in the CEI Hub are currently unknown. To 
provide a conservative est imate of damage, all  tanks are considered to be 
unanchored for the purpose of calculat ions. Figure 4-2 shows the probabili ty of 
DS 4 Unanchored Tanks for PGA values of 0.187g and 0.275g.  
D’Amico provides the highest  probabil ity of DS 4 damage at  14% and 24% for 
PGA values 0.187g and 0.275g respectively. Comparatively,  Hazus est imated 
0.95% and 5.0% probability  of DS 4 damage, and ALA estimated 1.5% and 4.6% 
probability of DS 4 damage. The difference in probability of fai lure from 0.187g 
and 0.275g decreases with higher DSs for all  fragility curves. The average 
difference in probability of damage from 0.187g to 0.275g for each DS is 
comparable between each fragil ity curve.  Hazus, ALA, and D’Amico have an 
average difference in probabili ty of damage of 4.9%, 4.0%, and 5.4% 
respectively.  Hazus shows a small  change in probability of damage for the PGA 
Figure 4 -2  Th e probabi l i t y  o f  damage as socia t ed  wi th  
PGA values  0 .187g and 0 .275g for  Hazus ,  ALA,  and  
D'Amico  unanchored  tanks  DS 4 .  
CE403 Honors Thesis Bal 
 P a g e  | 20   
range for anchored versus unanchored, while D’Amico and ALA show a larger 
change for all  tanks versus unanchored tanks.    
4.3 Percent Fill Amplification 
The expected damage for tanks with a high percent fill  is greater than average 
tank data. To provide a conservative estimate of the probabili ty of damage, the 
percent fill  parameters of ALA and D’Amico are used to scale the unanchored 
tank probability.  Figure 4-3 shows the probability of damage for ALA and 
D’Amico based on percent fil l .   
For D’Amico, the unanchored tank data contains al l fill  levels, and for ALA 
unanchored tanks contain fi ll  levels greater than or equal to 50%. The difference 
between probabil ity of failure for 90% fil l  and fil l  level used for unanchored 
tank analysis are determined at  the mean and mean plus one standard deviation 
PGA values.   
Figure 4 -3  The  probabi l i t y  o f  DS 4  damage as soc ia ted  
wi th  PGA values  0 .187g and 0 .275g  for  d i f feren t  f i l l  
l eve l s  according  to  ALA  and  D'Amico .  
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The value is added to the unanchored tank data at  the corresponding PGA value 
and DS. The objective is  that the percent difference in probability of failure is  
comparable between all tank data and unanchored tanks. Figure 4-4 compares 
the unanchored tank fragility to the scaled value.   
The objective of this analysis is for the new fragility probabil ity will simulate 
high filled unanchored tanks. Table 4-1 contains the calculated difference in 
probability of damage for the respective percent fil ls.   
Figure 4-4  DS 4  probabi l i ty  o f  damage  for  ALA and 
D'Amico  ver sus  ALA Scal ed  and  D'Amico  Scal ed .  
Parameter μ μ + σ
PGA (g) 0.187 0.275
ALA Difference 1.148 2.264
D'Amico Difference 24.936 32.037
ALA Difference 0.554 1.410
D'Amico Difference 15.433 19.715
ALA Difference - -




Table  4-1  The  d i f f e rence  i n  90% 
f i l l  and  percent  f i l l  u sed  i n  
unanchored  tank  analysi s  fo r  ALA 
and D’Amico .  
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As discussed in the Fragility Curve section, for DS 5 ALA provides a 90% fill  
curve that  is less than the 50% fill  curve for PGA values less than 1.15g, so 
there are no changes to ALA’s DS 5. For all DS and PGA values,  D’Amico 
provides a higher difference in probability values  than ALA. This is expected 
since D’Amico’s  percent fil l  fragility curve shows a more drastic difference as 
discussed in Section 3.3.  The affects of percent fi l l  cause a significant  change in 
D’Amico, up to 32% for DS 3.  The change is  less drastic for  ALA, up to a 
maximum of 2.3%. 
4.4 Expected Repercussions for CEI Hub 
The probability of damage for tanks with capacity greater than 100,000 gallons 
was determined for each fragility probability. The terminology “affected by” is  
used to describe tanks or total  gallons that would experience a damage level. 
Figure 4-5 shows the expected damage for number of tanks out of the 197 tanks 
for a PGA value of 0.275g. Figure C-1 graphs the expected damage for a PGA 
value of 0.187 in  Appendix C.  
Figure 4 -5  E xp ect ed  number o f  tanks  to  exper i ence d amage by  a  0 .275g 
PGA value .  
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D’Amico Scaled provides the highest estimate with approximately 110, 64, and 
30 tanks for DS 3, 4,  and 5 respectively.  With the exception of DS 5,  Hazus 
provides the lowest estimate with approximately 23, 9, and 4 tanks at DS 3, 4, 
and 5 respectively. For analysis purposes,  the DS 5 parameters for ALA and 
ALA Scaled are considered uncertain due to concerns discussed in Section 3.3.   
The probability for damage and expected repercussions are recorded in Table C-
1 for both PGA values of 0.187g and 0.275g. As expected, the predicted damage 
due to  a 0.275g PGA value is  significantly higher  than 0.187g.  
The estimated gallons of substance that  would experience different DS was 
determined by multiplying the number of total gallons and the probabil i ty of 
damage. Figure 4-6 shows the affected gallons for the PGA value of 0.275g. The 
expected affected gallons for a PGA value of 0.187g are in Appendix D.  
D’Amico Scaled predicts the highest damage at 158.9 million,  92.7 mil lion, and 
43.7 million gallons to experience DS 3, 4, and 5 damage respectively. 
Comparatively, D’Amico predicts 67.7 million,  36.6 million, and 8.08 million 
gallons for DS 3, 4, and 5 respectively. The D’Amico Scaled prediction is 2.4, 
Figure 4-6  Expect ed  gal lons  to  be  a f f ec ted  b y  a  0 .275g  PGA valu e.  
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2.5,  and 5.4 times larger than the D’Amico predict ion for DS 3, 4, and 5 
respectively.   Hazus provides the low prediction of 33.5 mill ion, 14.3 million, 
and 5.9 million gallons to experience DS 3, 4, and 5 damage respectively.  
4.5 Fuel Concerns 
The fuel repercussions are analyzed through Hazus and D’Amico Scaled to 
provide the range of probability. The fuel  is analyzed in terms of gallons,  and 
both D’Amico Scaled and Hazus are discussed using the mean plus one standard 
deviat ion value of 0.275g. Figure 4-7 shows the damage associated with Hazus.  
As discussed in Section 1, the largest  quantity of fuel  is  Gasoline and Diesel. 
According to Hazus,  gasoline is expected to have approximately 10.5 million, 
4.5 million, and 1.8 million gallons affected by DS 3, 4, and 5 respectively for a 
PGA value of 0.275g. Diesel  is expected to have approximately 7.3 mil lion, 3.1 
million, and 1.3 gallons affected by DS 3, 4,  and 5 respectively. Jet fuel  is 
predicted to have 2.2 million, 942 thousand gallons, and 386 thousand gallons to 
Figure 4-7  Fuel  d i s t r ibu t ion  o f  expect ed  gal lons  to  be  a f fect ed  by a  0 .275g P GA 
value .  
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be affected by DS 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Figure 4-8 shows estimated effects 
using D’Amico Scaled.  
D'Amico Scaled provides a significantly larger est imation. For gasoline, the 
predicted effects  are approximately 49.7 million, 29 mill ion,  and 13.7 million 
for DS 3,  4,  and 5 respectively. This trend is similar for Diesel, which provides 
a prediction of 34.6 million, 20.2 million, and 9.5 million gallons affected by 
DS 3,  4, and 5 respectively.  Jet  fuel  is  predicted to have 10.5 million, 6 .1 
million, and 2.9 mill ion gallons affected for DS 3,  4,  and 5 respectively. Table 
C-2 in Appendix C provides the expected damage for Hazus,  ALA, D’Amico, 
ALA Scaled, and D’Amico Scaled for the mean and mean plus one standard 
deviat ion PGA values.  
For context,  Oregon in 2017 used on average 4.45 million gallons of gasoline 
and ethanol (2019 Fuel Supply Forecast  2019).  The loss from the D’Amico 
Scaled prediction for gasoline and ethanol DS 5 combined is  10.7 million 
gallons. This equates to the amount used by all of  Oregon in  approximately two 
and a half days. In 2017, Oregon used on average 2.05 million gallons of diesel 
Figure 4 -8  Fu el  d i s tr ibu t ion  o f  exp ect ed  ga l lons  to  be a f fec t ed  by  a  0 .275g  PGA 
value  
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per day (2019 Fuel Supply Forecast  2019). The loss due to DS 5 damage from 
the D’Amico Scaled predict ion is  equivalent  to the diesel used by the entirety of 
Oregon in four and a half days.  This prediction does not take into consideration 
loss of content  due to DS 4 or DS 5. The low prediction from the Hazus DS 5 is  
equivalent to the diesel used in over half a day by the entirety of Oregon. This 
does not take into account loss due to DS 3 and DS 4.  These comparisons are to 
create context for the amount of fuel and is not an estimate for the direct 
repercussions to Oregon consumers.  The amount of fuel  lost does not  take into 
consideration the amount of  time that  the CEI Hub will be damaged and out of 
service, nor the availabili ty of fuel  from other storage areas.  
Conclusion 
This analysis provides insight into the CEI Hub’s Tank damage probabili ty 
through the use of existing Fragility Curves.  Hazus, ALA, and D’Amico 
fragil ity curves used to determine possible damage outcomes. The probability 
ranged from 3.0-56%, 0.95-33%, and 0.30%-15% for DS 3,  4,  and 5 
respectively.  The range accounts for different fragility curves and PGA values 
of 0.187g and 0.275g. The effects of percent fil l  and anchorage conditions were 
taken into account.  The effects of percent fill  for D’Amico caused the highest  
impact on in probability of damage. This analysis focused on damage due to 
ground accelerat ion, and future analysis should include possibility of 
liquefaction and fire damage. In addition, data on secondary containment,  tank 
anchorage condit ions, and average fill  data should be used to create a more 
informed analysis.  
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Appendix A – Secondary Containment 
                
Figure  A -1  (Lef t )  North ern  se condary conta inment  a rea s.  (Right )  Sou thern  sec ondary  conta inment  
areas .  
 
Tab le  A-1  Tota l  a rea ,  number  o f  tan ks ,  and  to ta l  cap aci ty  o f  s econdary  conta inment  a rea s.  Numb er  o f  
tanks  and  to ta l  capaci t y  d o  no t  take  in to  account  th e  100 ,000  ga l lon  capaci ty  cu t -o f f .  
        
SC Area (acres) Number of Tanks Total Capacity (gal)
BP1 2.9 11 13640110
BP2 0.355 7 221970
BP3 2.42 8 10084158
KM1 10.1 28 39279634
KM2 6.05 44 32582087
KM3 3.11 10 11900238
KM4 1.97 4 7881877
NU1 2.91 8 10985710
NU2 1.8 6 8252706
NU3 3.6 4 12457926
NU4 2.26 11 13483039
NU5 1.49 2 8400000
PH1 0.294 38 610100
PH2 3.29 12 12461194
PH3 2.21 10 5375772
PH4 0.592 3 1369242
PH5 3.14 21 9701866
PH6 0.066 1 20496
PH7 0.249 2 36876
PTS1 1.51 3 140000
PTS2 2.07 2 135000
CH1 8.05 28 47923305
MC1 10.7 11 38758692
MC2 0.262 3 1283604
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Appendix B – Fragility Curves 
Tab le  B-1  Ha zus  lognorma l  parameters  fo r  f rag i l i t y  curves  
(Fed eral  E mergen cy  Managem en t  Agen cy,  2020) . .  
 
DS>=2 DS>=3 DS>=4 DS=5
m(g) 0.29 0.5 0.5 0.87
μ(ln(g)) -0.5376 -0.30103 -0.30103 -0.06048
σ(ln(g)) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.5
m(g) 0.12 0.23 0.41 0.68
μ(ln(g)) -0.92082 -0.63827 -0.38722 -0.16749
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Tab le  B-2  ALA lognormal  f rag i l i t y  cu rve  para meters  
(Amer i can  L i f e l ine  Al l ianc e,  2001)  
 
DS>=2 DS>=3 DS>=4 DS=5
m(g) 0.38 0.86 1.18 1.16
μ(ln(g)) -0.97 -0.15 0.17 0.15
σ(ln(g)) 0.8 0.8 0.61 0.07
m(g) 0.56 >2.00 - -
μ(ln(g)) -0.58 - - -
σ(ln(g)) 0.8 0.4 - -
m(g) 0.18 0.73 1.14 1.16
μ(ln(g)) -1.71 -0.31 0.13 0.15
σ(ln(g)) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4
m(g) 0.22 0.7 1.09 1.16
μ(ln(g)) -1.51 -0.36 0.09 0.15
σ(ln(g)) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.41
m(g) 0.13 0.67 1.01 1.15
μ(ln(g)) -2.04 -0.4 0.01 0.14
σ(ln(g)) 0.07 0.8 0.8 0.1
m(g) 0.71 2.36 3.72 4.26
μ(ln(g)) -0.34 0.86 1.31 1.45
σ(ln(g)) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
m(g) 0.15 0.62 1.06 1.13
μ(ln(g)) -1.9 -0.48 0.06 0.12
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Tab le  B-3  D 'A mico  lognormal  f ragi l i ty  curv e parameter s  




Figure  B -1  D'Amico  percent  f i l l  f rag i l i t y  cu rves .  (To p  Right )  DS  3 .  (Top Lef t )  DS 4 .  (Bo t tom Right )  
DS 5 .  
 
DS=2 DS>=3 DS>=4 DS=5
μ(ln(g)) 14.317 0.526 1.241 3.512
σ(ln(g)) 7.795 1.256 1.457 1.96
μ(ln(g)) 10.256 -0.104 0.549 2.311
σ(ln(g)) 7.795 1.256 1.457 1.96
μ(ln(g)) 4.84 -0.943 -0.373 0.71
σ(ln(g)) 7.795 1.256 1.457 1.96
μ(ln(g)) 1.69 -0.563 -0.049 0.488
σ(ln(g)) 2.243 1.02 1.096 1.128
μ(ln(g)) 1.967 0.109 0.281 0.862
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Figure  B -2  ALA p ercen t  f i l l  f ragi l i t y  curves .  (Top  R ight )  DS 3 .  (Top  Le f t )  DS 4 .  (Bot tom R ight )  DS  5 .  
 
Figure  B -3  D'Amico  and  A LA unanchored  tanks  versus  a l l  tanks  frag i l i t y  cu rves .  (Top  Right )  DS 3 .  
(Top  Lef t )  DS  4 .  (Bot tom R ight )  DS 5 .  
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Figure  B -4  Hazu s unancho red  tan ks  verus  an chored  t anks  f ragi l i t y  cu rves .  (Top  Righ t )  DS 3 .  (Top 
Lef t )  DS  4 .  (Bot tom Right )  DS  5 .  
 
 
Figure  B -5  Hazu s,  ALA,  and  D'Amico  unanchored  tanks  f ragi l i t y  cu rves .  (Top Right )  DS  3 .  (Top  Lef t )  
DS 4 .  (Bo t tom Righ t)  DS 5 .  
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Figure  B -6  Hazu s and  ALA  anchored  tan ks  f rag i l i t y  curves .  (Top  Righ t )  DS  3 .  (Top Lef t )  DS  4 .  
(Bo t tom R ight )  DS  5 .  
 
Figure  B -7  ALA ancho red  tanks  verus  a l l  tanks  f ragi l i t y  curves .  ( Top R ight )  DS  3 .  (Top Lef t )  DS 4 .  
(Bo t tom R ight )  DS  5 .   
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Table  C-1  P robabi l i t y  o f  d amage,  expect ed  numb er  o f  tanks  and  conten t  a f f ec ted  for  the  mean and 
mean p lus  on e s tandard  d evia t ion  PGA va lu es .  
Figure C-1  Expected  number o f  tanks  a f fec t ed  by  th e  mean 
PGA value  (0 .187g) .  
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Figure C-2  Expected  number o f  ga l lons  a f fec t ed  by  t he mean  
PGA value  (0 .187g) .  
Table  C-2  E xpect ed  fue l  r epercussions  for  each  f rag i l i t y  e s t imat ion  fo r  a  (Top )  PGA value  o f  0 .275g  
and (Bot tom)  PGA va lu e  o f  0 .187g .  
